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the state law insofar as the property interests of the widow created
3
by state law are concerned.'

The district court in Bray held Yiatchos to be controlling and
that the transfer of the bonds was in violation of California Civil
Code Section 172. The son was ordered to account for the funds improperly transferred.
CONCLUSION

Federal law will govern the ownership of United States Savings
Bonds, except when such a determination of ownership will act
to deprive the widow of a property right which is granted to her
by state law. To defeat the survivorship provisions of United States
Bonds, fraud, measured by Federal standards, but guided by state
property law, must be present. Bray could not have disposed of
these funds during his life without his wife's permission, nor may
he do so at death under the protection of the Supremacy Clause of
the Federal Constitution.
Frank Mills

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN
CASES: IN

MISDEMEANOR

RE JOHNSON

(CAL. 1965)
In recent years there has been considerable judicial expansion
of the right to counsel, particularly with the decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright' making the Sixth Amendment counsel provision applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. One aspect of the problem that remains unclear is
whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to appoint
counsel to defend an indigent charged with a misdemeanor.
The California Constitution and Penal Code also provide for
the right to counsel. Article 1, Section 13, of the state constitution
provides that "In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the
party accused shall have the right . . . to appear and defend, in
person and with counsel." In addition Sections 859 and 987 of the
Penal Code provide for court appointment of counsel:
13 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964).
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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When the defendant is charged with commission of a public
offense, over which the superior court has original jurisdiction ...
if the defendant desires and is unable to employ counsel, the court
2
must assign counsel to defend him.
If the defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, he
must be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel
before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid
of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ counsel, the court
must assign counsel to defend him.3

Despite the seemingly clear language of these statutes, the
California cases present a confusing picture of the basis and scope
of the right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases.
In People v. Agnew,4 the defendant's request for appointed
counsel was denied and the defendant was subsequently convicted.
The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that the
defendant had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel.
The basis of the court's decision is somewhat ambiguous. The court
speaks of Article 1, Section 13, of the California Constitution as
granting the right to counsel, but also discusses at length the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not clear
from the decision whether the court relied on the federal or state
constitution in reversing the conviction.'
In Re Newbern,6 another misdemeanor case, dealt primarily
with the courts' duty to advise a criminal defendant of its right to
counsel and the requirement that counsel be allowed sufficient time
to effectively prepare the case. The court in Newbern cited Penal
Code Section 859 as requiring counsel to be appointed in all cases
where the accused is financially unable to employ counsel. The
court's interpretation of section 859 disregards the express language
limiting its applicability to cases within the jurisdiction of the superior courts.
The recent case of In Re Johnson7 effectively resolves the ambiguity of the Agnew decision and clarifies the interpretation of
Penal Code Section 859. Johnson was convicted of multiple traffic
offenses and sentenced to serve consecutive terms of 180 days on each
of five complaints. The facts indicate that Johnson appeared at the
trial court with numerous other individuals charged with traffic
offenses. Johnson was unrepresented by counsel. The assembled de2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 859.

3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 987.
4 114 Cal. App. 2d 841, 250 P.2d 369 (1952).

r See Note, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 501
(1960).
0 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960).
7 62 A.C. 336, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965).
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fendants were collectively advised of their constitutional rights and
then individually arraigned. Johnson entered pleas of guilty to all
five complaints; he was then held in the court room until the conclusion of the remaining cases at which time sentence was imposed.
Johnson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus contending that
he was not adequately advised of his constitutional rights and that he
had made no valid waiver of his right to counsel. His petition was
sustained by the Supreme Court on the ground that he had not
waived his right to counsel. The court held that his plea of guilty was
not conclusive of waiver; and that the fact of waiver should be
determined before the court accepts any plea.
The court relied on Article 1, Section 13 of the state constitution as the basis of Johnson's right to counsel:
Under this provision there can be no doubt that the fundamental
constitutional right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings is, in
California at least, not limited to felony cases but is equally guaranteed
with misdemeanors in a municipal or other into persons charged
8
ferior court.

In a note to the court's decision in the Johnson case, the court
explains the interpretation of Penal Code Section 859 as applied
earlier in Newbern and following in Johnson.
Although on its face section 859 applies only to cases "over which the

superior court has original jurisdiction" it is declaratory in this respect

of the several duties of the magistrate which give meaning and effect9

to the constitutional guarantee of counsel "in any court whatever."

In summary, the clear import of the Johnson case is that there
is a right to a court appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases, which
right arises under Article 1, Section 13 of the state constitution and
exists independent of the federal Constitution. In addition Penal
Code Sections 859 and 987 are not to be construed as limiting the
scope of the constitutional policy in any way; their purpose is to
define the duties of the court in implementing the constitutional
provision.
Frank Clohan
s

Id. at

340, 398 P.2d at 422.

9 Id. at 341, n.2, 398 P.2d at 423, n.2.

